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1 Introduction
This issue of Erasmus Law Review explores the relation
between law and society by investigating different con-
ceptions of social norms. The idea of this special issue
saw the light of day during the meetings of a discussion
group that we organised for our fellow PhD candidates
of the Erasmus Graduate School of Law (EGSL). The
aim of the discussion group was to stimulate debate
among peers and thereby benefit from the diverse disci-
plinary backgrounds of the participating PhD candi-
dates and guest speakers. In exploring the relation
between law and society we have found it both helpful
and challenging to focus, in particular, on the relation
between legal and social norms. Although norms are
central concepts in both law and the social sciences,1 we
have observed great variety in the way norms are con-
ceptualised. Both the exchanges in the discussion group
and the contributions to this issue illustrate that legal
norms and social norms can be understood in different
ways. From a legal perspective, norms include legal
rules and principles laid down in, for example, an Act of
Parliament, and can be seen as closely linked to state
authority.2 However, not all scholars agree that state
authority is necessary to consider a norm to be a legal
norm.3 The definition of social norms is ambiguous.4
There is no consensus among social science scholars on
the question of how social norms should be conceptual-
ised.5 A social science (sub)discipline that studies social
norms as its main occupancy is non-existent. Actually,
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1. See e.g. the discussion in M. Svensson, ‘Norms in Law and Society:
Towards a Definition of the Socio-legal Concept of Norms’, in M. Baier
(ed.), Social and Legal Norms: Towards a Socio-legal Understanding of
Normativity (2013) 39. We have excluded moral norms in this issue as
our primary concern is the relation between legal and social norms. On
moral norms in relation to social and legal norms, see e.g. G. Brennan,
L. Eriksson, R.E. Goodin & N. Southwood, Explaining Norms (2013), at
5-7.
2. Brennan et al, above n. 1, at 5.
3. See e.g. the discussion in B. Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law
and Society (2001), at 173ff.
4. C. Horne. ‘Sociological Perspectives on the Emergence of Social Norms’,
in M. Hechter and K.D. Opp (eds.), Social Norms (2005) 3, at 3-4.
5. Ibid.
social science (sub)disciplines apply a variety of terms to
refer to similar or overlapping notions of norms. Rele-
vant terms include custom, convention, role, identity,
institution and culture.6
In our view, social norms can be defined as social phe-
nomena that prescribe and/or proscribe behaviour in
certain circumstances and that are considered to be at
least partly responsible for regulating social behaviour.7
However, not every (sub)discipline in the social sciences
or law that investigates the relation between law and
society actively reflects on how social norms might be
conceptualised. Hence, the process of editing this issue
was challenging in some respects because our aim was to
develop a topic that would be broad enough to be of
interest to a wide audience, yet also contribute to exist-
ing academic discussions in studies on law and society.
As the contributions of this issue illustrate, a wide varie-
ty of conceptualisations of social norms are applied to
study the relationship between law and society. In our
attempt to grasp the various conceptions of social
norms, we have found it helpful to establish a continu-
um of conceptions of social norms. Following Banakar
and Travers’ distinction between consensus and conflict
approaches in the field of sociology,8 we have found it
helpful to distinguish between static and dynamic con-
ceptions of social norms.9 This continuum between stat-
ic and dynamic conceptions of social norms is informed
by classic epistemological debates in social theory on
consensus versus conflict, structure versus agency per-
spectives, and postmodernism.10 Static conceptions
stress that social norms arise out of a situation of con-
sensus in society. Generally held social norms are con-
stitutive of a society in this conception. A dynamic con-
ception of social norms denies that a general consensus
could exist in a given society that would inform general-
ly held social norms. Instead, social norms represent at
the most a limited consensus. Generally held beliefs can
differ between social groups and change over time.11
6. Ibid.
7. M. Hechter and K.D. Opp, ‘Introduction’, in M. Hechter and K.D. Opp
(eds.), Social Norms (2005) xi.
8. R. Banakar and M. Travers, ‘Introduction’, in R. Banakar and M. Travers
(eds.), Law and Social Theory (2013) 1, at 4-6.
9. On consensus and conflict approaches, see also e.g. I. Marsh, M. Keat-
ing, S. Punch & J. Harden, ‘Sociological Theories’, in I. Marsh, M. Keat-
ing, S. Punch & J. Harden (eds.), Sociology: Making Sense of Society
(2009) 45.
10. On these debates, see Banakar and Travers, above n. 8, at 4-8.
11. Scholars who rely on a dynamic conception of social norms sometimes
avoid referring to norms because the term might suggest that a general
consensus could exist or develop in society.
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Scholars who explore the relation between law and soci-
ety often rely on a specific conception of social norms.
In the following sections we intend to illustrate how a
static conception (Section 2) and a dynamic conception
of social norms (Section 3) may impact how one under-
stands the complex relation between law and society.
Based on the contributions of this issue, we illustrate
how a particular conception of social norms may materi-
alise with both its strengths and weaknesses. In the fol-
lowing sections we will elaborate on our ‘continuum’ of
social norms by sketching the theoretical landscape of
this continuum and reflecting on where and how the
three contributions of this issue fit. Because we consider
that no rigid or clear-cut distinction can be made
between static and dynamic conceptions of social norms,
we will begin with the contributions at one end of the
continuum. Our landscape starts with static conceptions
of social norms, that is the economic insights provided
by rational choice theories, and then goes on to consider
generally shared beliefs or values, as theorised by Durk-
heim. We will then move towards more dynamic con-
ceptions of social norms to which critical and interpreti-
vist approaches belong.
2 Static Conceptions of Social
Norms: Consensus in
Rationality and Values
Static conceptions of social norms can often be found in
theories that approach law and society from a rational
choice perspective. Yuan’s contribution to this issue, for
example, explains how in transnational mercantile prac-
tice both social and legal norms have developed over
time. These norms aim to regulate the behaviour of par-
ties in conducting their business. In this contribution,
rational choice theories are used to explain the develop-
ment of these norms in the field of transnational busi-
ness law. Generally, rational choice theories explain how
the behaviour of individuals is informed by a cost and
benefit analysis.12 These theories approach society from
an economic perspective in which individuals are
deemed to behave rationally, meaning that individuals
aim to further their preferences.13 Theories that analyse
how individuals determine what behaviour would bene-
fit their preferences explain social norms in terms of
costs and benefits. From the perspective of rational
choice theories, certain patterns of behaviour would be
rational given particular circumstances and thus
12. See e.g. the collection of essays in J. Elster (ed.), Rational Choice
(1986).
13. For a discussion of these theories in the field of sociology, see e.g.
C. Silling and P.A. Mellor, The Sociological Ambition: Elementary Forms
of Social and Moral Life (2001), at 164-184, and in the field of crimi-
nology R.H. Burke, An Introduction to Criminological Theory (2014), at
29-77.
improve overall utility.14 Social norms can therefore be
explained in terms of a consensus between rational indi-
viduals.15 As rational choice theories emphasise that
social norms exist because they provide overall benefits
to individuals,16 social norms also need to be understood
in light of these costs and benefits. A number of charac-
teristics follow from a rational choice perspective on law
and society. First, by approaching social norms from a
rational choice perspective, enforcement becomes an
important issue of concern. Social norms need to be
enforced as free riders may try to gain benefits without
incurring costs when following a social norm.17 Enforce-
ment therefore ensures that social norms are followed by
individuals. Second, rational choice theories explain
social norms, first and foremost, at the level of individu-
al behaviour. A different static conception of social
norms may be more fruitful if one wishes to approach
the relation between law and society from a macro per-
spective.
A macro perspective on the relation between law and
society that relies on a static conception of social norms
is possible if one approaches social norms in terms of
generally shared beliefs or values. Pei’s contribution to
this issue, for example, explains how a particular form of
alternative dispute resolution in the Chinese legal sys-
tem, criminal reconciliation, is informed by the general-
ly held belief in Chinese society that disputes between
individuals should be resolved in an informal manner.
She describes, from a historical perspective, how this
generally shared value has been reflected in the Chinese
criminal justice system. The idea of values as signalling
a general consensus within society can be found in the
work of sociologist Émile Durkheim. In his The Division
of Labor in Society, Durkheim makes a distinction
between mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity.18
Mechanical solidarity exists in societies where individu-
als share the same values. Organic solidarity, on the other
hand, exists in societies where individuals, in light of the
division of labor, may pursue different values. In his lat-
er work, however, Durkheim argues that individualism
actually does provide a shared frame of reference, based
on which individuals can pursue different values with-
in a society insofar as they respect each other’s autono-
my.19 Durkheim’s ideas about solidarity illustrate how a
form of shared consensus within society could give rise
to social norms. Static conceptions of social norms that
focus on shared beliefs or values are able to explore how
values in a society are reflected in a legal system. Durk-
heim, for example, claimed that mechanical solidarity
corresponds to a particular form of law, which he called
repressive law. Organic solidarity, on the other hand, is
reflected in what Durkheim called restitutive law.
14. T. Voss, ‘Game-theoretical Perspectives on the Emergence of Social
Norms’, in M. Hechter and K. Opp (eds.), Social Norms (2001) 105.
15. Silling and Mellor, above n. 13, at 176.
16. Voss, above n. 14, at 110ff.
17. Id. 113ff.
18. E. Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (1997).
19. See R. Cotterrell, Émile Durkheim: Law in a Moral Domain (1999), at
112-115.
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Although Cotterrell has argued that Durkheim did not
subscribe to this view in his later work,20 Durkheim’s
ideas about values do provide an intuitive understanding
of the relation between law and society. More generally,
the view that social values should be reflected in a legal
system has been called by Tamanaha the mirror thesis.21
By conceptualising the relation between law and society
in this way, one can investigate whether generally
shared values in a society are adequately reflected in the
law. However, Tamanaha is also critical of the mirror
thesis. One of his critiques is that society is actually not
reflected in the law, as the mirror thesis would suggest.
Western legal systems, in his view, do not actually
reflect any substantive values held in society. This in
turn brings to the fore the importance of procedures
that ensure that law is generally recognised as valid.22
3 Dynamic Conceptions of
Social Norms: Complexity
and Conflict
Dynamic conceptions of social norms see not consensus,
but diversity as the central determinant of social life. As
society, according to thinkers of the more dynamic per-
suasion, is complex, diverse and ever changing, it is
impossible to assume that social organisation is based on
general consensus. People and groups often have com-
peting and conflicting interests.23 Following Tamana-
ha’s mirror thesis, one could, for example, explore how a
particular part of society is reflected in a legal system.24
Critical approaches to law and society, in particular, are
able to explore this issue. Critical approaches in social
theory emphasise the role of conflict rather than consen-
sus in society, and this tradition frames social life in
terms of a power struggle between the dominant and
subordinate groups. The critical tradition has its off-
spring in the ideas of Karl Marx. Law in this perspec-
tive is seen as implicated fully in economic exploitation
and the upholding of social relations that generate
inequality.25 Law is considered representative of the
interests of those in power. In this critical perspective,
social norms are equally treated sceptically, as what is
considered to be a social norm strongly depends on
stratification in society. A critical approach to law and
society is not illustrated in the contributions to this
issue. However, the critical school is the largest and
most influential tradition in the studies of law in society,
at least in the English-speaking world.26
20. Id., 82ff.
21. Tamanaha, above n. 3.
22. Id., 96ff.
23. Marsh et al, above n. 9, at 54-56.
24. Tamanaha, above n. 3, at 40-44.
25. R. Banakar and M. Travers, ‘Section 3: Critical approaches. Introduc-
tion’, in R. Banakar and M. Travers (eds.), An Introduction to Law and
Social Theory (2013) 91, at 91.
26. Ibid.
Dynamic conceptions of social norms can also focus on
individuals and groups of individuals in a diverse soci-
ety. The last contribution by Thaddeus Müller provides
us with an insightful example of an interpretivist
approach to law and society. The interpretivist tradition
has a dynamic and diversified conception of social life in
which meaning is established on the basis of human
interactions. Distinct from the critical tradition, which
studies social class groupings, the interpretivist project
studies the individual. Interpretivists depart from the
idea that people are thinking, reasoning beings who
attach meanings to what they do. The general aim of the
interpretivist is therefore to address how people under-
stand and justify their own behaviour. Max Weber’s
concept of verstehen points to the methodological impli-
cations of how to carry out this type of research; instead
of looking at human beings from the outside, through
pre-formed categories, the principle of verstehen points
to discovering and understanding the meanings people
give to their own behaviour. Interpretivists aim to
describe and explain this so-called internal perspective.
Weber applied his methodology to explain large-scale
social changes in society, and he is perhaps most known
for his work on the Protestant ethic and how it contrib-
uted to the rise of industrialisation in Western Europe.27
Contemporary researchers in the interpretivist para-
digm, of which symbolic interactionism is perhaps the
most well established,28 have applied Weber’s method-
ology to the processes of social interaction in daily life of
people in specific small-scale contexts.29 Müller, for
example, highlights how interpersonal relationships
between enforcement officials and youth in public space
are crucial to the way social control in public space is
enforced in Dutch society. As Müller shows in his con-
tribution, symbolic interactionists emphasise the sym-
bolic meaning of individual behaviour. He argues that
owing to a lack of trust between enforcement agents and
youth hanging around in public space in urban areas,
the behaviour of youth in public space in the big cities is
scrutinised more closely. During these interactions
between youth and police, symbolic notions of mascu-
linity may further inflate the interaction. Finally, Mül-
ler’s contribution shows that a symbolic interactionist
approach to social norms can be combined with a more
critical element when changing the unit of analysis from
a micro interactional approach to a macrostructural
approach. By comparing the differences between how
youth in urban and rural areas are policed, Müller is
able to explore why immigrant youth are more often
perceived as deviant in Dutch society. When compared
with indigenous youth, immigrant youth more often live
in urban areas and therefore most likely hang around in
public space in urban areas. Because public space in
urban areas is scrutinised more closely than public space
27. Marsh et al, above n. 9, at 63-70.
28. Id., 72-73.
29. Ibid.
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in rural areas, this difference in policing could be seen as
a bias against immigrant youth in criminal policy.30
4 Conclusion and
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30. Although not explored in the contributions to this issue, as editors we
were interested in how postmodern approaches to law and society
would fit in the continuum of static and dynamic conceptions of social
norms. In postmodern approaches, legal and social norms are consid-
ered discursive practices that generate binary and hierarchical relation-
ships. Furthermore, in a world of discourse, norms no longer prescribe
behaviour; they are performative. Postmodern approaches could there-
fore scrutinise our view that law and society can be explored in terms of
norms. On postmodern approaches to law and society in general, see
e.g. R. Banakar and M. Travers, ‘Section 5: Postmodernism. Introduc-
tion’, in R. Banakar and M. Travers (eds.), Law and Social Theory
(2013) 211, and the contributions to this volume.
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